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16 April 1973



Comments and queries on the contents of this publication are welcome. They should be directed to the officers named in the individual articles.

16 April 1973

CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
Directorate of Intelligence

CHINESE AFFAIRS

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Waiting for the Shoe to Drop

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Chinese diplomacy has begun to zero in on the return of 90,000 Pakistani prisoners held in India as the key to normal Sino-Indian relations. In dialogues which have become more cordial with time, Chinese officials have told Indian diplomats that movement on this issue, which would allow Peking to maintain support for Pakistan, would swiftly bring a major improvement in Sino-Indian ties.

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Peking has sought to clear the air in other visible ways. Sensing Indian unease with the Soviets, some Chinese diplomats have been hinting at a mutuality of interest in reducing Moscow's influence; Peking has recently posted a higher ranking charge in New Delhi; and, at Chinese initiative, provocative propaganda exchanges have ended between Chinese and Indian garrisons along the Himalayan frontier.

China also has been active with Pakistan. During Pakistani General Tikka Khan's visit earlier this year, Peking spoke mildly and stressed the need for equitable and negotiated solutions to South Asian problems. Peking apparently made no new military assistance commitments to Tikka and thus avoided provoking India. At the same time, positive articles in the Chinese press have encouraged Pakistani moves on the repatriation and Bangladesh recognition questions.

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Peking's emphasis on a settlement of the prisoner issue as a prerequisite for normal relations with New Delhi is an added incentive for India to reach a settlement with Pakistan. The same is true, although to a lesser degree, for Bangladesh.

China is well aware of the enormous difficulties involved in reaching a settlement and realizes that the pace of diplomacy is likely to remain deliberate and that it can do little to force the issue. Peking, moreover, attaches higher priority to other foreign policy problems such as the USSR, the US, and Japan. The Chinese remain patient, although encouraged by

Indian interest in better relations and, more importantly, by signs from both
New Delhi and Islamabad of heightened interest in a settlement.

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Permutations in the Anti-Lin Campaign

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The campaign to denigrate Lin Biao has been a prominent feature of the Chinese political scene for the past year and a half. Peking has still not denounced Lin by name in the public media--the phrase "swindler like Lin Shao-chi" is used instead--but from time to time certain changes are introduced into the campaign. Lin is long since dead, and these changes presumably reflect backstage maneuvering among the survivors of the stormy events in September 1971.

Around the middle of last year a new slogan appeared: "Criticism (of Lin) must come first and rectification of work style later." Propaganda accompanying the slogan made it clear that the intent was to keep the campaign on a theoretical level, avoid vendettas, and head off a broad confrontation between Peking and local provincial leaders, many of whom are military men. Early this year, the official description of Lin's crimes was reversed. For over a year Lin had been denounced as an ultra-leftist; after the shift, it was asserted that although Lin "at some times and on some issues" appeared to use ultra-leftist tactics, he was really an ultra-rightist. The new line has not yet been authoritatively endorsed. It could be the work of those within the current leadership closely associated with the excesses of the Cultural Revolution. These figures are undoubtedly anxious to dissociate the anti-Lin campaign from the extremist programs and policies which they themselves promoted during and immediately after the Cultural Revolution.

The anti-Lin drive is being reinvigorated. Following last year's poor harvest, criticism of Lin and the shortcomings of local rural authorities have been linked at meetings throughout the country. In Kiangsi Province the top-ranking party leader advised provincial officials on 31 March to take the lead in punishing Lin "by mouth and by pen." At the same meeting an economic spokesman criticized Lin's ultra-leftist errors, and a representative of the provincial party newspaper lashed out at his "ultra-rightist essence." According to an account, the party chief himself avoided taking sides.

The notion of criticizing both orally and in writing was first advanced in a *People's Daily* editorial on 8 March. That same day, according to foreign observers present, Premier Chou En-lai attacked the former defense minister by name at a tea party in Peking and linked him to the extremist actions taken against foreign diplomats and experts in China during the hectic summer of 1967.

[REDACTED]

The speech may have been impromptu. The next day the *People's Daily* published only a short resume of it, glossing over Chou's biting remarks about the ultra-leftists. The speech must have been discomfiting to Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, who was at the party and who was instrumental in stirring up the xenophobic excesses against foreign personnel and property.

Liu Shao-chi was not criticized by name until late 1968, some two years after he had been removed from power. Since the anti-Lin campaign has become a politically charged point of contention in Peking, it could take much longer to brand him a villain publicly. Indeed, recent Chinese broadcasts have reminded listeners that it took ten years to wipe out every trace of Wang Ming, a renegade from the party's early history. [REDACTED]

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Troubled Provinces

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Political maneuvering in Peking continues to breed violence in the provinces. High tension and politically motivated clashes in several provinces, often involving army units, have been reported by travelers since last summer. The outbreaks apparently were precipitated by a round of purges, aimed mostly at provincial politico-military leaders, which began last spring. These and earlier moves against military leaders stem directly from the Lin Biao affair but have claimed both pro- and anti-Lin victims. While Lin and most of his closest military supporters have been removed, the political forces set in motion by the affair have not quieted down.

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The most recent report of violence comes from Szechwan [redacted] of an armed clash there in January between cadres sent by Peking and local officials. Each group was supported by a different faction of the army. This report backs up several earlier accounts of trouble in Szechwan. The clash appears to have been related to maneuvering over replacements for the top two political leaders, one of whom was purged in the fall of 1971 while the other died early last year. Appointment of a new provincial party first secretary in February—just after the reported clash—does not necessarily mean that the contending factions have been reconciled or that further disruptions will not occur.

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The situation in Szechwan illustrates a continuing political problem: friction between cadres discredited during the Cultural Revolution but now rehabilitated and local officials who gained their posts through the Cultural Revolution. [redacted] recently stated that this friction was "at the root" of much of the political tension in Kwangtung Province. [redacted] there was friction between party and army cadres, but stressed [redacted] only part of the larger dispute between old and new leaders.

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[redacted] has reached a new stage in Kiangsi Province, where left leaning [redacted] men who had held leading state and party posts since the Cultural Revolution have been purged. Replacing them were veteran military and civilian cadres, some of whom were transferred from other provinces. At present the leading personality in the province is an experienced military man who came from Foochow Military Region headquarters. His transfer should help the military region commander, Han Hsien-chu, to assert control over affairs in Kiangsi. Although the province falls within his

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This competition has reached a new stage in Kiangsi Province, where left-leaning military men who had held leading state and party posts since the Cultural Revolution have been purged. Replacing them were veteran military and civilian cadres, some of whom were transferred from other provinces. At present the leading personality in the province is an experienced military man who came from Foochow Military Region headquarters. His transfer should help the military region commander, Han Hsien-chu, to assert control over affairs in Kiangsi. Although the province falls within his

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[redacted]

military purview, Han and the previous Kiangsi leadership were at odds. Factional fighting in Kiangsi got so bad that in the summer of 1972 the province was closed to travelers.

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There have been scattered reports of violence from other provinces, including Fukien, Kweichow, Ningsia, and Sinkiang. Kweichow has long been troubled. There is turmoil in the leadership; very few top leaders have appeared in public since the provincial party committee was formed in May 1971. [redacted] the top two leaders in Kweichow were publicly denounced in June 1972 and that a high-ranking military officer had taken over on a temporary basis.

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Political competition in the countryside is not a simple civilian-military split. Civilians and soldiers are on both sides of most key issues, and both sides look to patrons in Peking for leadership and support. The struggles in the provinces undoubtedly complicate the political infighting in Peking with the result that the provincial and top-level disputes have by now become mutually reinforcing. The fact that military men have been replaced by other military men in Szechwan, Kiangsi, and Kweichow would appear to indicate that, at the provincial level at least, the army remains the ultimate arbiter.

[redacted]

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Fathers and Sons

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An effort to discredit former defense minister Lin Piao's son, who is said to have died with his father in a plane crash in Mongolia, is reportedly under way in Kwangsi Province. [redacted] the campaign is being interpreted there as a move against politburo member Yao Wen-yuan because he, like Lin's son, is young and related to a top leader. (Yao is widely believed to be Mao's son-in-law.) Yao's close association with the radical Mme. Mao and his own leftist credentials have probably antagonized moderate leaders such as Chou En-lai, who would no doubt like to clip Yao's wings.

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The younger Lin, named as a ringleader in his father's alleged coup plot, has figured prominently in the continuing criticism of Lin Piao. Although there is no other evidence to date of a campaign against the son personally, attacks on nepotism, whether aimed at young Lin or at Yao, are beginning to surface. Late last year, *People's Daily* condemned the practice and said Mao believes in promotion based on merit. On 28 February, a broadcast from Liaoning attacked the "father and son" of the Chiang Kai-shek family. This theme may have as much relevance for Peking as for Taipei, especially because Liaoning counts among its top leaders Mao's nephew, Mao Yuan-hsin.

The main target of the anti-nepotism line is most likely Yao, who has been the center of conflicting stories about the succession. Inaccurate western press releases last fall quoted Chou En-lai as saying Yao was Mao's successor. These stories were hotly denied by a number of Chinese officials, and Peking reportedly issued a document to refute the press reports. In early March, at the same time the criticism of Lin's son was reportedly launched in Kwangsi, cadres in neighboring Kwangtung were allegedly told that the succession question was not a "father-son enterprise," and that "contrary to popular belief," no one had been named to succeed China's top leaders. Whether he is Mao's son-in-law, Yao certainly has close ties to the Chairman through Mao's wife, Chiang Ching, a connection that might make Yao's detractors reluctant to attack him directly. For them, a campaign against Lin's son would be a useful ploy to discredit Yao. [redacted]

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Law of the Sea: Chinese Policy Takes Shape

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Peking used the recent session of the UN General Assembly Seabeds Committee to reassert its support for the maritime claims of Third World nations and to sharpen its own policy in preparation for the 1974 Law of the Sea Conference. From the Chinese point of view, the immediate gains were few.

The Chinese directed steady criticism at the two super-powers, accusing them of seeking maritime hegemony, plundering ocean resources belonging to underdeveloped countries, and selfishly opposing the legitimate claims of underdeveloped countries to expand their maritime economic rights. As the committee session wore on, the Chinese turned their attacks on the USSR, charging that Moscow seeks to impose on underdeveloped nations international standards to which it is unwilling to submit. The Chinese went on to attack the current law of the sea conventions as devices to maintain the predominance of the super-powers.

Peking's representatives backed up the criticism by informally circulating draft articles on the extent of the territorial sea and transit through straits. Although the Chinese had some difficulty lining up co-sponsors, the draft was obviously drawn with an eye on the underdeveloped nations. It would give coastal states the right to define their own territorial seas. Straits lying within territorial waters would be considered parts of the territorial sea, even if frequently used for international navigation.

The draft also endorsed each country's right to exclusive economic zones beyond the territorial seas; the limits of these zones would be determined by geographic and geological considerations, the country's resources, and its plans for national economic development. The draft gives no specific limit for either territorial waters or the economic zone, thus opening the way for support of the claims by some Latin American nations to a 200-mile zone. Throughout the paper, the Chinese emphasize negotiations as the means of resolving conflicting claims.

The articles do not deal with the use of the oceans beyond the economic zone, but speeches by Peking's representatives provide some insight into Chinese thinking. They called for international machinery to control exploitation of deep ocean resources and scientific research and for suspension of such exploitation until the machinery is created. They also

[redacted]

advocated banning nuclear submarines and weapons from international waters.

Both the US and the USSR oppose most of these proposals. So far none of the Third World countries has displayed any particular enthusiasm for them. The Mexican representative, for example, called the proposals "naive." Nevertheless, the Chinese probably will continue to lobby for support and may formally submit their paper during the summer meeting of the Seabeds Committee in Geneva. This would be their first major initiative at the UN. [redacted]

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A Test of Wills

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The attempt to revitalize certain Cultural Revolution by-products, the so-called "new things," is encountering stubborn resistance in the provinces. The drive promotes a number of controversial programs, such as the Red Guard movement, the revolutionary model plays developed by Mao, Mao, the elevation of young cadres, the down-to-the-countryside movement, and the enrollment of workers, peasants, and soldiers as university students.

Despite articles in the December and January issues of *Red Flag* and a call in the New Year joint editorial, the provincial media ignored "new things" until late February, when Honan touted a less controversial example, model production units. After other provinces apparently failed to respond, Peking tried again in March. An article in *People's Daily* and still another in *Red Flag* have thus far moved only Chekiang and, more recently, Kwangtung to pick up the theme.

These leftist-inspired programs have long been unpopular with moderate leaders. Politburo member and Kiangsu party boss Hsu Shih-yu, speaking to the recently concluded provincial Youth League congress, failed to pay tribute to the Red Guards or the rustication movement. Peking municipal party boss Wu Te followed suit at the Peking city Youth League congress. Both leaders preferred to leave this task to others.

Despite the generally cold reception to date, the new things campaign may be causing some changes on the academic front. The spring student enrollment has not been held, even though the Chinese apparently planned to enroll students in the fall and spring until the universities were full. Contrary to the purpose of Mao's radical prescriptions for the reform of higher education, poorly educated worker-peasant-soldier students do not follow the same curricula as their better prepared colleagues. Spring enrollment may have been suspended in order to review the policy toward worker-peasant-soldier students. (See Annex)

Lin Biao and his supporters attacked many of the new things in the 571 document, their alleged coup plan. In the current campaign against Lin, cadres are expected to criticize him for his opposition to these programs. Many have failed to do so, however, because they too oppose the unpopular measures. The attempt to justify these programs may have been prompted by the cadres' failure to defend them. With the possible exception of the spring enrollment suspension, the new things campaign is mostly sound and fury, and moderates seem determined to keep it that way.

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ANNEX

Two Tracks for Higher Education

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Chinese higher education collapsed in mid-1966, and colleges and universities did not reopen for four years. Even when the doors began to open, radical across-the-board changes in education policy made for a highly politicized and vocationalized system. Recent revisions have improved some aspects of education in science and engineering, but the improvement is by no means universal. Two different types of higher education are now available. Some students are pursuing fairly rigorous academic programs, apparently offered only at certain universities. Many of these students will probably go on to postgraduate training and eventual careers in scientific research. The majority of students undergoing "higher education" are pursuing the advanced vocational training offered at all universities.

When the schools reopened in the fall of 1970, publicized requirements for admission emphasized criteria related to a student's class background and political record rather than academic qualifications. All college entrants were to have undergone a minimum of two years of labor experience, and the rigorous nationwide college entrance examination that had been abolished in 1966 was not reinstituted. It soon became evident, however, that students selected without reference to academic qualifications could not meet the study requirements, and even qualified students experienced difficulty overcoming long absences from school. The Chinese have now revised the 1970 admissions schemes and are re-emphasizing academic capabilities for at least a portion of the college entrants. Entrance examinations are being administered by many local units and by some colleges, and procedures are evolving to admit some students, especially in the science and fine arts fields, directly from secondary schools without an intervening labor experience.

During the Cultural Revolution, curricula in science and engineering were attacked as irrelevant to China's problems and level of development, and the principles of higher education were redefined. When the schools reopened, only vocational training was offered. Courses previously lasting four to six years were cut to two or three, theoretical courses were deleted, and practical labor was emphasized.

The Cultural Revolutionary system was too narrow and shallow to prepare the kind of high-quality, well-rounded scientists and engineers

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needed for research and development work in military and industrial fields. To correct this deficiency, basic theoretical course work has now been reinstituted in certain universities and colleges. Because of the increased difficulty of the curricula, numerous schools are forced to offer entrants refresher courses lasting 6 to 12 months. Other indications of an upgrading of standards are the return to course examinations, which were abolished at the beginning of the Cultural Revolution, and the extension of college training at certain universities to three or four years. Although productive labor remains part of the new curriculum, it does not take up as much time, and attempts are being made to relate it to a student's field of study.

China has relatively few doctoral-level researchers (5,000 to 6,000), but it does have large numbers of baccalaureate-level scientists and engineers (roughly a million). There were indications that China could not effectively utilize all the baccalaureate-level scientists and engineers who were produced before the Cultural Revolution. Many were underemployed, if not unemployed. The developing dual approach to higher education should help satisfy China's needs for a large number of trained workers and technicians and for a small number of highly educated researchers without overpopulating the intermediate ranks of baccalaureate-level scientists and engineers.

The Chinese have indicated that postgraduate training will resume as soon as university graduates are available. Just when this will occur is unknown, because the length of the upgraded undergraduate programs is still not settled. Recent proposals for postgraduate training reflect the need for people capable of "advancing the scientific development of the country." Doctoral-level scientists and engineers are scarce, and the loss of this type of manpower during the Cultural Revolution has retarded Chinese scientific progress. China has chronically had a dearth of highly educated manpower, but the resumption of postgraduate training should gradually overcome this deficiency.

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CHRONOLOGY

- 23 March Chinese aid program in Mongolia officially terminated.
- 30 March Chou En-lai receives North Vietnamese and PRC ambassadors regarding implementation of Paris Agreement. (Meeting reported by NCNA on 4 April.)
- 31 March Chou En-lai and other senior Chinese officials visit British Industrial Exhibition in Peking. Peter Walker, British secretary of state for trade and industry, completes visit to China. Japanese Ambassador Heishiro Ogawa arrives in Peking.
- 1 April China and Romania sign 1973-1974 scientific cooperation agreement. Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua hosts banquet for visiting Albanian delegation.
- 2 April Hungarian Premier Jeno Fock receives new Chinese Ambassador Li Tse-wang. President Ahidjo of Cameroon ends visit to China.
- 3-11 April Iranian Minister of Economy visits China; signs first Sino-Iranian trade and payments agreement.
- 3 April New Zealand ministerial delegation ends visit to China. Japanese ambassador presents credentials to Tung Pi-wu. *People's Daily* editorial lauds progress toward implementation of Paris Agreement in Vietnam; first Chinese commentary on subject in nearly a month.
- 5 April Alfred L. Jenkins, deputy chief of the US Liaison Office in China arrives in Peking; meets with Vice Foreign Minister Chiao Kuan-hua the following day. PRC ambassador to Japan, Chen Chu, presents credentials to Emperor Hirohito.
- 8 April Chou En-lai receives Heishiro Ogawa, Japanese ambassador to Peking.

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- 9 April Chou En-lai receives newly appointed Greek ambassador to Peking.
- 10-12 April Madame Binh visits Peking; holds talks with Chou En-lai and Chi Peng-fei; leaves for North Korea.
- 11 April Sihanouk met by Chou En-lai and large turnout of Politburo and senior Foreign Ministry officials on his return from Indochina; *People's Daily* editorial lauds results of Sihanouk's trip.
- 11 April China attends meeting of UN Economic Commission for Asia and the Far East for first time; Chinese delegation walks out next day in protest over address by Cambodian representative.
- 12 April Chou En-lai hosts banquet for Sihanouk; calls for end to American bombing in Cambodia and withdrawal of US support for Lon Nol Government as keys to Cambodian settlement.
Former party secretary general Teng Hsiao-ping reappears at banquet for Sihanouk. NCNA identifies Teng by his old government title, vice premier.
- 12 April US Steel Corporation receives invitation to attend Spring Canton Fair, bringing to 20 the number of US firms invited to date.
Peking purchases a \$41 million fertilizer complex from Japan, raising whole plant purchases for 1973 to a record \$300 million.
- 14 April PRC releases five of six Japanese nationals who have been held in China on spy charges.
- 15 April Han Hsu, the new deputy chief of the Chinese Liaison Office, departs Peking for Washington.
- 16 April Large Chinese delegation headed by China-Japan Friendship Association President Liao Cheng-chih arrives in Tokyo for month-long visit.

